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Across the country, African American defendants are being discriminated against in the 
criminal courts and by juries, particularly in capital cases.1 This assertion is supported by two 
lines of research. First, an analysis of Supreme Court decisions focusing on the racial impact on 
voir dire. Second, social-legal studies on juror decision making have demonstrated legal and 
socio-legal histories providing evidence that demonstrate there is a racial bias in our system. 
Based on these findings, this paper sets forth several legal and policy recommendations to 















1 Jack Glaser, Karin D. Martin, Kimberly B. Kahn, Possibility of death sentence has divergent effect on verdicts for 
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In the words of Clarence Darrow, a famous American trial attorney from the early 20th 
century, “almost every case has been won or lost when the jury is sworn.”2  As such, exploring 
the biases of potential jurors is essential because juror bias, not evidence, may sway verdicts and 
result in injustice. This is especially important in capital punishment cases where the finality of 
death is imposed.  
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution protect defendants’ rights, 
including the right to a fair and impartial jury.3 Specifically, the Sixth Amendment ensures that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury.”4 As courts review the constitutionality of topics such as the jury selection, 
they determine their interpretations within the context of the Sixth Amendment by determining 
whether an impartial jury was formed and through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to ensure equal protection for any citizen, regardless of race.5 Lastly, the Eighth 
Amendment guarantees protection from cruel and unusual punishment and is the basis for the 
debate concerning whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.6  
Throughout history, juries have been selected in order to create a fair and impartial jury. At 
common law, jurors were required to be impartial – individuals capable of being unaffected by 
external pressures and internal biases.7  In 1895, the Supreme Court defined the job of the jury 
 
2 Judge Robert M. Dow Jr., Eric Andrews, Laverne Morris, Selecting a Jury can be Complicated During Divisive 
Political Times 1 (June 2018). 
3 U.S. Const. Amend. VI.  
4 U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 
5 U.S. Const. Amend. VI; See also, U. S. Const. amend. XIV.  
6 U.S. Const. Amend. XIII. 
7 Jeffrey Abramson, We the Jury, 100 (1994). 
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by holding that jurors must follow the court’s instructions rather than taking both the facts of the 
case and the law into their own hands.8 Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all 
criminal trials required a jury that could not be waived for reasons relating to public policy; this 
changed in 1930  when the Court held that the right to a jury trial may be waived by a 
defendant.9 However, when a defendant elects to participate in a jury trial, the jury must be one 
that is fair to the defendant. The Supreme Court held in 1975 that the constitutional right to trial 
by jury “required that the jury pool be a mirror image or microcosm of the eligible community 
population.”10 These together create a very specific idea of what a constitutional jury for any 
given trial should look like – reflective of whatever community the defendant is to be tried in. To 
contrast, another idea on constitutional jury composition creates a jury that attempts to 
encompass fairness – a democratic cross-sectional jury.11 The goal of this kind of jury is to bring 
about diverse ideas and even biases to be used during deliberation.12 Through this form of juries, 
one juror might bring a perspective that another would not otherwise be exposed to. This 
becomes very significant at trial because of the great impact of jury composition on the outcome 
of trial. The process of creating a diverse jury composition is accomplished through jury 
selection.  
Judges and attorneys play a significant role in determining the composition of juries. 
Through voir dire, parties can eliminate prospective jurors who are unfit to serve as jurors, while 
also ensuring that the population of the jury is composed of jurors who are not biased against 
 
8 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1985).  
9 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 308 (1930).  
10 Id. at 100. 
11 Id. at 101. 
12 Id. 
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either side. The question to be answered upon review is whether jury selection based on race 
should be allowed in death penalty cases, where the punishment is so severe and so permanent 
that there is no room for error.  
The implications of research on the implications of juror decision making on the outcome of 
trial go beyond that of our legal system and delve into the need for social reform with regards to 
African American defendants. Research into sociology and psychology with regard to these 
kinds of cases will force both our legal system and our country to acknowledge that African 
Americans have been and continue to be discriminated against throughout the history of the 
United States legal system. As more researchers begin to make inquiries and face these issues 
head on, the closer our legal system will be to reforming those issues.       
This thesis will examine constitutional decisions on racial discrimination, the impact of race 
on capital punishment decision making and come to conclusions about the corrective measures 
that should be implemented to reduce bias. Part III reviews the history of Supreme Court rulings 
on the death penalty through examining the history of the death penalty, landmark cases on the 
death penalty, and contemporary issues with the death penalty. Part IV analyzes the process of 
decision making by identifying three concepts that tend to affect the outcome of a capital trial for 
African American defendants: the race of the defendant, the race of the victim, and the quantity 
of evidence offered at trial. Part V discusses research that may lead to reforming jury selection in 
capital cases. Part VI comes to conclusions about racial biases and jury selection.  
This thesis concludes that first the Supreme Court must allow voir dire based on racial biases. 
Second, this thesis concludes that the jury for African American defendants must be racially 
diverse jury composition in order for the defendant to receive a fair and just trial. 
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III. Review of Supreme Court Rulings on the Death Penalty 
 
History of the Death Penalty 
 
The legal controversy surrounding the death penalty is rooted in the Eighth Amendment 
protection from cruel and unusual punishment.13 The Eight Amendment states: “Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 
By reviewing cases on the death penalty, the Supreme Court states its interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment in its holdings.  
There are two schools of thought when it comes to the interpretation of the Constitution: 
originalism and a living constitution. Under the idea of a living constitution, the Eighth 
Amendment is vague for the very purpose of it being altered and changed along with the culture 
of our country and what is deemed to be “cruel and unusual.” As the ideas of morality and 
normality change throughout time, as does the applicability of this amendment to crime and 
punishment in our country. It is then up to the courts to decide how to apply the Eighth 
Amendment to these principles. According to originalist ideas, however, the words of the 
forefathers and what they intended at that time in history is how the Constitution should be 
interpreted today. Under this idea, the Eighth Amendment must be construed according to what 
the intent of the forefathers was in creating this amendment.   
The death penalty has been part of American culture for centuries, dating back to the 
1700s.14 Influenced by early political policy and strong Christian ideals, the Framers of the 
Constitution considered the ramifications of the death penalty, advocating for its use in only the 
 
13 U.S. Const. Amend. XIII.  
14 Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The End of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American Death Penalty Regime 
in the Twenty-First Century, 90 OR. L. REV. 797 (2012). 
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most serious of cases.15 This ideal was put into practice around the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, when the court system began to reject the British practices of mandatory death 
penalty.16 Since then, the death penalty has been used in only the most serious of cases with very 
careful discretion used to put someone to death for his or her crimes.17 Some states, such as 
Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Iowa and Maine, abolished the death penalty entirely.18 During the 
earliest part of the twentieth century, many states abolished the death penalty; however, this 
progressive movement did not last long.19 Within the next decade, half of those reinstated the 
death penalty, turning back the clock on capital punishment reform.20 Even after narrowing the 
use of the death penalty, the practice has only evolved and brought about controversy that is still 
heavily debated.  
In 1972, the Supreme Court reviewed the death penalty for three cases within the context 
of the Eighth Amendment in Furman v. Georgia.21  In this case, three men were sentenced to 
death for murder in Georgia, rape in Georgia, and rape in Texas, respectively.22 Each case was a 
trial by jury.23 The Court held that because the death penalty was applied arbitrarily or in a 
discriminatory way, “the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”24 The Court reasoned that in many cases, the death penalty is applied to people in 
 
15 Id. at 797.  
16 Id. at 802.  
17 Id. at 803. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).   
22 Id. at 240.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 242.  
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poverty and African American defendants.25 This is evident in cases with co-defendants in 
Texas, the state where one petitioner was sentenced to death.26 In 16% of Texas cases with co-
defendants, the defendants received separate trials, allowing for different sentencing.27 In many 
cases, white co-defendants would receive life imprisonment while their black counterpart would 
receive the death penalty.28 By holding that the death penalty could not be applied arbitrarily or 
in a manner that is discriminatory, the court took the first step to addressing the arbitrariness that 
leads to the incarceration of men and women on death row, including thousands of African 
American men.    
 
Landmark Cases on Jury Selection and Race 
 
Over the course of time, the Supreme Court has grappled with the appropriate procedural 
safeguards surrounding voir dire, especially concerning racial biases. An early case that focused 
on racial prejudice in jury selection was Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981).29 In this case, the 
Court held that racial prejudice (here involving a Mexican defendant) may be explored in voir 
dire if two prongs are satisfied: 1) the crime is one of violence, and 2) the defendant and victim 
are members of different racial or ethnic groups.30 In the Rosales-Lopez case, Humberto Rosales-
Lopez participated in a plan, along with a white female, to illegally bring three Mexican aliens 
over the border.31 Before trial, Rosalez-Lopez’s attorney requested voir dire concerning 
 
25 Id. at 249-250.  
26 Id. at 251.  
27 Id. at 251.  
28 Id.  
29 Rosalez-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).  
30 Id. at 192.   
31 Id. at 184.  
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prejudice towards Mexicans.32 This request was denied.33 Instead, the trial judge questioned 
potential jurors about their feelings and prejudices towards immigration and aliens. 34 With 
regard to its holding, the Court reasoned that the process of voir dire must be left to the 
discretion of the trial judge. The only time that a trial judge must question prospective jurors is in 
cases where issues of race and prejudice are so readily apparent throughout the course of the case 
that there is a substantial likelihood of racial prejudice infiltrating the minds and passions of the 
jury.35 It is important to note that this likelihood is not a small likelihood or a mere possibility; 
the courts found it necessary for questioning if and only if there is a heavily weighing possibility 
of prejudice. This created a very narrow set of circumstances that allowed for questioning based 
on the racial biases of prospective jurors. The Rosalez-Lopez case was not a capital case, but still 
set forth the precedent for deciding how jury selection may be conducted.   
The Supreme Court awarded more latitude during voir dire for African American defendants 
in 1986 when deciding the landmark case of Turner v. Murray.36 This case held that voir dire 
that questioned the racial prejudices of prospective jurors may be allowed in capital punishment 
cases.37 In this case, a black man was indicted for shooting and killing a white man in the course 
of a robbery in Virginia.38 The question on appeal was whether the court erred in allowing for 
voir dire based on racial prejudice.39 The Court concluded that “a defendant accused of an 
interracial capital crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the victim’s race and 
 
32 Id. at 185.   
33 Id. at 186-187.   
34 Id. at 186.  
35 Id. at 182.  
36 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). 
37 Id. at 28. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 29. 
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questioned on the issue of racial bias.”40 The Supreme Court reasoned that because the crime was 
interracial and sought to impose the death penalty, voir dire based on racial prejudice should be 
allowed, and the court did not err in doing so.41  
When deciding Turner v. Murray, the Supreme Court looked back at prior rulings including 
Ristaino v. Ross, decided in 1976. In the Ristaino case, the Court held essentially the opposite of 
Turner v. Murray; the court held that jury selection that involves questioning on racial prejudice 
would not be allowed.42 Although the Turner majority considered the Ristaino holding, the Court 
did not overturn Ristaino. Ristaino and Turner both involved a violent crime involving a 
defendant and victim of different races, but the Court declined to use this as the reasoning for its 
holding in Turner v. Murray. Instead, the Court noted that the difference between Ristaino v. 
Ross and Turner v. Murray is the sentence of death.43 Ristaino may still be applicable to other 
cases in holding that voir dire of prospective jurors based on race is unnecessary, but the Court 
held it is not applicable where a defendant faces the imposition of death, like in Turner v. 
Murray.44 Because the sentence of death is so severe and permanent, Turner v. Murray held that 
voir dire based on race would be allowed at that level of punishment.45 This case, decided in 
1986, was yet another step towards eliminating the discrimination faced by African American 




40 Id. at 28. 
41 Id. at 33-35. 
42 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). 
43 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). 
44 424 U.S. 589 (1976). See also, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). 
45 476 U.S. 28 (1986). 
 13 
Current Legal Issues with the Death Penalty 
 
During voir dire, either party may challenge prospective jurors through one of two 
methods: peremptory challenge or challenge for cause. A challenge for cause is a challenge of a 
potential juror that has a bias against the defendant or other reason that they may not be impartial 
throughout the case.46 Challenges for cause are unlimited throughout the process of voir dire 
because it is the defendant’s right to a constitutional trial with a jury free of bias.47 To contrast, 
peremptory challenges are challenges of a prospective juror that may be made without giving a 
reason.48 In capital cases, both parties are permitted twenty peremptory challenges.49 However, 
there are certain exclusions to the ability of a party to excuse a juror without reason including 
challenge based on race, gender, or membership in a distinctive group.50  
At the heart of issues with jury selection is the prosecutor.51 Prosecutorial misconduct is 
an area of law that is harder to reverse, especially when it comes to unconstitutional voir dire, 
due to the substantial errors involved.52 When considering other facets of law, there are easier 
solutions.53 Evidence found on faulty grounds or a coerced confession can be thrown out with a 
motion to suppress. To contrast, when a prosecutor commits an unconstitutional use of 
peremptory challenges, the case ends in a reversal or a dismissal of charges.54 Improper 
 
46 47 AM. JUR. 2D Challenges to Jurors for Cause, Generally § 193 (2020).   
47 Id. § 193.  
48 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury Number of Peremptory Challenges to Jurors § 200.  
49 Id. § 200.  
50 47 AM. JUR. 2D JURY § 206; See also 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 207; See also 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 208.  
51 Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1999).  
52 Id. at 717-18.  
53 Id. at 715.  
54 Id. at 717-18.  
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peremptory challenges are one of the few areas of misconduct in which the court considers 
intent.55  
The concept of “unconstitutional jury selection” stems from the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment applying due process to the states. The Equal Protection Clause 
provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”56 To make 
decisions about the constitutionality of challenges conducted during jury selection, the Court 
must look to the Equal Protection Clause and consider its interpretation of the law as it applies to 
cases before the Court.    
Unconstitutional peremptory challenges had been brought up to the court on appeal multiple 
times by 1995. However, rather than limiting the prosecutor’s ability to exclude jurors in a way 
that was unconstitutional, the Court took a step backwards. The decision in Purkett v. Elem made 
it easier for prosecutors to arbitrarily exclude jurors. In the Purkett case, the prosecutor excluded 
a prospective juror based on the appearance of his hair and facial hair.57 The Court held that the 
reasonableness of a race-neutral reason for excluding a prospective juror is not a factor that must 
be considered in determining whether the exclusion should be allowed.58 For this reason, race-
neutral explanations given by prosecutors do not need to be “persuasive, or even plausible.”59  
When the courts first began addressing the issue of unconstitutional jury selection, a 
defendant claiming his or her rights were violated through improper peremptory challenges 
 
55 Id. at 718.  
56 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 
57 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).  
58 Id. at 764-765.  
59 Id. at 768.  
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needed to prove a consistent pattern of racial discrimination by the prosecuting attorney.60 
Because of the absurdly high burden of proof, the Court reconsidered its holding by changing the 
test used to determine a violation of the defendant’s rights through the jury selection process. 
The Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky in 1986, a landmark case aimed at 
remedying the problem of racial discrimination through jury selection.61 Although this case was 
not a capital case, it set forth a remedy for both capital cases and cases that do not involve the 
death penalty. In Batson, the prosecutor used four peremptory strikes to excuse all members of 
the jury who were black.62 The defendant was also black.63 When deciding this case, the court 
looked back to its holding in Swain v. Alabama, determining that the holding in Swain v. 
Alabama was inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.64 In altering the 
outcome of their previous case law, the court held a number of new requirements for both 
prosecutors and defendants when considering violations of the Equal Protection Clause in voir 
dire;  
1. The Equal Protection clause protects a defendant from exclusion of the members of his 
own race from the jury, for reasons based solely on race.65  
2. Although prosecutors are entitled to peremptory challenges without cause, a defendant is 
entitled to jury selection that is not based on race.66 No juror may be struck on the for the 
lone reason of that particular juror belonging to the same race as the defendant.67  
 
60 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).  
61 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
62 Id. at 79.  
63 Id. 
64380 U.S. at 202. 
65476 U.S. at 79. 
66 Id. at 79. 
67 Id. 
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The court also altered the test for determining whether there was been a violation of the Equal 
Protections Clause.68 To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must: 
1. Show the defendant is part of a recognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has made 
an attempt to excuse prospective jurors of that racial group.69  
2. The facts and circumstances all point to the reasonable inference that the prosecutor has 
made an unethical attempt at excluding members of the jury based on their race in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.70  
Once this standard of a prima facie case has been met, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to 
identify a race-neutral reason for striking each prospective juror that was excused with a 
peremptory challenge.71 In the Court’s opinion, the Court listed four main arguments that may 
not be used by a prosecutor to meet the burden of proof.  
1. The defendant need not show a pattern or history of such conduct and may use the 
facts laid out by the prosecutor in that case alone.72 
2. The inference that a black juror may favor a black defendant is not sufficient 
reasoning for striking a black prospective juror.73  
3. Peremptory challenges with the sole basis of discrimination and eliminating 
members of a particular race will not be justified, even if they are equally applied to 
white jurors, black jurors, and any other race alike.74  
 
68 Id. at 80.  
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 80.  
72 Id. at 97.  
73 Id. at 80.  
74 Id. at 122.  
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4. The fact that both the state and defense may use racially discriminatory peremptory 
challenges is not a reason that a prosecutor may use to justify their use of 
discriminatory exclusion of prospective jurors.75  
The court, based on the prima facie case and the reasoning of the prosecutor, will then 
determine whether there is what is known now as a Batson violation.76  
The Court extended the holdings in Batson five years later in deciding Powers v. Ohio.77 
After Batson, parties primarily objected to excluding prospective jurors of the defendant’s own 
race.78 In Powers v. Ohio, the Court extended its ruling by holding that a Batson violation claim 
could be raised regardless of if the prospective jurors eliminated were of a dissimilar race to the 
defendant. The Court reasoned that “to bar a petitioner’s claim because his race differs from that 
of the excluded jurors would “condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, 
and privilege of jury service.”79  
The Batson test is still the test used when there is a claim that a defendant’s Equal Protection 
rights have been violated throughout jury selection through discriminatory peremptory strikes. In 
June of 2019, the Supreme Court used the Batson test to decide Flowers v. Mississippi, one of 
the most recent cases regarding jury selection, racial discrimination and the death penalty.80 The 
Supreme Court held that, in the sixth trial of defendant Curtis Flowers, the state prosecutor 
committed a Batson violation during pre-trial jury selection.81  
 
75 Id. at 125-26.  
76 Id. at 98.  
77 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).  
78 Id. at 405. 
79 Id. at 415.  
80 Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).  
81 Id. at 2235.  
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In 1996, Curtis Flowers killed four employees at the Tardy Furniture Store in Mississippi.82 
Out of four victims, three victims were white. Flowers is a black defendant.83 Since 1996, Curtis 
Flowers has been through a total of six trials, each involving prosecutorial misconduct, Batson 
violations, and mistrials.84 The sixth trial came before the Supreme Court on appeal with the 
question: Were the State’s reasons for peremptory challenge of five black jurors race-neutral? 
The Court was to determine whether the State committed yet another Batson violation in the 
prosecution of Curtis Flowers. The Court reversed the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court 
and held that, yes, the state prosecutor did violate Batson.85 
The Supreme Court reached its ruling for four main reasons. First, the Supreme Court 
looked to the prosecutor’s history of peremptory challenges in Flowers’ case.86 Of the 36 
prospective jurors, the state attempted to strike every one of them throughout jury selection in the 
Flowers’ first four trials.87 Because of this, the state courts upheld a finding of a Batson violation 
on the part of the state twice.88 Second, there was a clear pattern in the way the state conducted 
jury selection.89 In both the first four trials and the sixth trial, the state attempted to rid the jury of 
black jurors and create a jury that was entirely white.90 Third, the ratio of time spent on black 
versus white jurors was shockingly disproportionate; one hundred and forty-five questions were 
asked of the five black jurors while a mere twelve questions were asked to a total of eleven white 
 
82 Id. at 2228. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 2235. 
86 Id. at 2228. 
87 Id. at 2236. 




jurors.91 Lastly, the state exercised peremptory challenges on black jurors with faulty, inaccurate 
reasoning. In some instances, the state claimed to strike black jurors for knowing defense 
witnesses and members of Flowers’ family.92 This reasoning may sound justifiable standing 
alone; however, a number of white prospective jurors had relationships with both the defense 
witnesses and the defendant’s family without being questioned on this matter, let alone stricken 
as jurors.93 
When using the Batson test, the court examined the totality of the circumstances to reach 
its holding with all of the relevant and necessary facts. Because of the clearly egregious pattern 
of the state’s prosecutor, the Supreme Court upheld a Batson violation, and reversed and 
remanded the case.94 Because Flowers was an indication to the Court that the Batson test was not 
working, it is both an example of the ever-present racial biases in the courtroom and the struggle 









91 Id. at 2247. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 2244. 
 20 
IV. Research on Juror Decision Making 
 
Research in juror decision making has focused on a number of factors that make the penalties 
for African American defendants harsher than those imposed for the same crime by a white 
defendant.95 Some of these include juror race, victim race and strength of evidence.96 Research 
recorded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics showed that although the number of white men and 
black men on death row is fairly equal, the population of free black men compared to the 
population of black men on death row is severely disproportionate.97 While African Americans 
account for forty-two percent of the men on death row, only thirteen percent of American 
citizens are black men.98 Those percentages should be more similar, but they are not similar 




Of the few studies that have focused on race and juror decision making, many rely on 
entirely white participants, which presents significant issues in generalizability of these 
findings.100 By implementing an experimental design that includes only part of the jury pool, the 
outcomes of the studies were significantly shifted the because the studies give a limited and 
narrow perspective on juror decision making. Three studies, however, display the effects of this 
kind of study well: Sweeney and Haney in 1992, Mazzella and Feingold in 1994, and Bowers, 
 
95 David M. Flores, Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Capital Juror Decision Making: An Empirical 
Examination, 55 (May 2010). 
96 Id. at 55.  
97 Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment, 2017: Selected Findings 1 (2019). 
98 U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: United States 1 (2018); See also NAACP Death Penalty Fact Sheet (2017). 
99 Jack Glaser, Karin D. Martin, Kimberly B. Kahn, supra, note 1 at 539.  
100 Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL CRIM. PSYCHOL. 171 (2007). 
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Sandys, and Brewer in 2004. Sweeney and Haney studied exclusively white participants.101 Two 
years later, Mazzella and Feingold conducted a study that included white and black participants; 
however, participants were divided into two test groups based on their race.102 Lastly, Bowers, 
Sandys, and Brewer conducted a study in 2004 that involved both black and white participants 
who previously served together on real trials rather than mock trials.103  
 Sweeney and Haney conducted fourteen studies involving almost three thousand 
participants to investigate the effect of juror race on sentencing.104 Their study was a meta-
analytic review of experimental studies.105 As for methodology, the study was limited to only 
white participants.106 The variable that changed was defendant race: trial transcripts indicated 
either a white defendant or a black defendant.107 To complete this study, mock jurors were 
provided with trial transcripts.108 Participants were instructed to make decisions about guilt and 
make sentencing recommendations.109 The study altered the defendant’s race and altered whether 
the case was interracial in a small amount of cases.110 All fourteen studies taken into 
consideration for Sweeney and Haney’s meta-analysis were conducted within the United States. 
At the conclusion of reviewing the fourteen studies, there was a significant finding that showed 
 
101 Id. at 173.   
102 Id.  
103 William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys, Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots 
of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing when the Defendant is Black and the Victim is White, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1499 
(2004).  
104 Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL CRIMINOL PSYCHOL 173 (2007). 
105 Laura T. Sweeney, Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytical Review of 
Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & THE L. 173 (1992). 
106 Id. at 183. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 184.  
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an anti-black tendency in white mock jurors.111 These jurors tended to recommend a longer and 
harsher sentence to African American defendants than to the white defendants used in the 
study.112 However, the authors noted that although this is true, the racial discrimination is not 
solely against black defendants; the unrealistic standard of culpability is often attributed to the 
members of any dissimilar race, not just African American defendants.113 Overall, the results of 
the study confirmed the hypothesis that white mock jurors tend to hand out harsher sentencing 
penalties to African American defendants.114 
The study conducted by Mazzella & Feingold was quite similar with one significant 
difference: the studies included participants of all races.115 Included in that study were around 
6,700 people.116 In this study, to contrast from Sweeney and Haney, racial bias was not 
significant, masked in part by the guilt factor of a racially diverse study group.117 Effect size 
shows the statistical significance between two factors for testing. In these studies, the effect size 
was a mere .06, showing that racial bias was highly insignificant and showed little effect on 
decision making.118 The Mazzella and Feingold study is a prime example of the positive effects 
of a diverse jury composition when compared to the study completed by Sweeney and Haney.  
Lastly, the study completed by Bowers, Sandys and Brewer shifted the perspective from 
sentencing decisions to juror making decisions. This is the most recent study of the three 
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discussed. The data for this study was received form the Capital Jury Project.119 This project 
interviewed jury members who served on capital trials across the country.120 Fourteen states were 
included: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.121 This study set itself 
apart from others when it utilized raw data from jurors that served on real trials rather than mock 
jurors, significantly increasing its credibility and applicability. A little over one thousand 
participants’ information was used in this study from a total of three hundred and fifty-three 
trials.122 As part of the interviews, jurors were asked about their descriptions of the defendant, 
feelings about the defendant’s family, how the defendant regarded his family, their consideration 
of mitigating circumstances, and their responses to levels of aggravation.123 The study concluded 
that white jurors were more likely to view African American defendants as dangerous and 
unlikely to feel guilty for their actions.124 This was specifically true for white male jurors, 63.3% 
of whom viewed black defendants as more dangerous.125 White jurors were also less likely to 
consider mitigating circumstances in coming to their conclusions throughout trial by a forty-
point difference between white jurors and black jurors.126 This finding is statistically significant 
by a p value of .054.127 Black male jurors, on the other hand, were more likely to feel empathy 
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for the defendant and the defendant’s family by a thirty-point difference between black male 
jurors and every other subject category.128 The study overall had more realistic and accurate 
responses than any other study as they included participants who sat on a legitimate trial, rather 
than listening or reading a mock trial.  
While some studies yield statistically insignificant results, others find a strong probability 
of white juror bias when it comes to decision making. However, the majority of studies agree 
that juror race has some effect on juror decision making, almost always a negative one for 
African American defendants.  The effects of jury composition have yet to be studied extensively 
and would tend to replicate the study conducted by Bowers, Sandys and Brewer as they are one 
of the few studies on juror decision making to take into consideration data from both black and 
white participants. An even smaller amount of data has been collected on jurors of races that are 
not black or white, such as Latinos or Asian-Americans. This research should be conducted in 




Another factor that researchers have focused on to assess juror decision making is the race of 
the victim. Based on research conducted by the Death Penalty Information Center, there have 
been two hundred and ninety-one executions where the defendant was black, and the victim was 
white since 1976.129 When those are reversed, the statistics are shockingly low in comparison. Of 
all of the cases where there have been white defendants perpetrating a black victim, there have 
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been only twenty-one executions – a statistic that is one hundred and thirty-nine percent lower 
than the rate at which juries execute black defendants convicted of killing white victims.130  
In 2004, Holcomb, Williams and Demuth conducted a study to investigate the effects of a 
victim’s race on death penalty sentencing.131 The result of the study showed that white female 
victims were disproportionately represented in cases where defendants were given the death 
penalty when compared to their actual number of homicides.132  
The focus of the Holcomb, Williams and Demuth study was narrow, including only 
homicides in Ohio. The data was gathered from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Supplemental Homicide Reports from 1981-1997.133 After analyzing the sentences and 
demographics for each case, they found disparity in how defendants of any race who kill white 
victims and black victims were punished. Defendants who were prosecuted for killing white 
victims were 1.766 times more likely to receive the death penalty than non-white victims.134 This 
finding was statistically significant (p < .01).135 A defendant who kills a black male victim has 
only a twenty-two percent chance of receiving the death penalty, which is seventy-eight percent 
less than a white female victim. 136 To contrast, black victims are less likely to receive the justice 
than white victims receive through sentencing.137 
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Strength of Evidence 
 
The final factor most often studied by sociologists involves the quantity of evidence admitted 
at trial. This factor is a control factor, and it is presumed that in cases where evidence is the 
strongest, jurors can confidently rely on the information in front of them.138 In cases where 
convincing evidence is lacking, jurors may resort to other factors to render their decisions.139 
Regardless of how much trial is offered by the prosecution and defense at trial, the basis of every 
trial is evidence. The evidence of a trial will make or break a case. The strength of evidence is 
important to jurors and tends to effect whether the defendant’s race will become an extralegal 
factor.140  
In 1979, Ugwuegbu completed a study showing the impact of strength of evidence on juror 
decision making.141 Until Ugwuegbu’s study, strength of evidence was not a control factor 
studied extensively.142 Studies have been completed in civil cases or in general criminal cases, 
but not with regards to the effects of strength of evidence on racial biases in juror decision 
making.143 Both black mock jurors and white mock jurors participated in this study; however, the 
two test groups remained separate.144 The variables included the defendant’s race, the victim’s 
race and the strength of evidence.145 Ugwuegbu studied whether the lack of culpable evidence 
would result in mock jurors relying on race in determining outcomes.146 Ugwuegbu conducted a 
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controlled experiment with two different study groups.147 Group one involved two hundred forty-
four white undergraduate students while group two involved one hundred eighty-six black 
undergraduate students.148 By creating these subject groups, interracial juror decision making 
was not studied.149  
The first experiment involved only white undergraduate students.150 The control group was  
given a scenario involving race-neutral case briefs and asked to analyze the culpability of the 
defendant.151 The results showed only one significant effect that skewed the results: sex of the 
participant.152 Males tended to need more evidence to come to conclusions about culpability in 
the control group.153 In experimental portion of the study, the mock jurors read different case 
briefs with different variables throughout the groups.154 The crime used throughout the study was 
aggravated and forcible rape of a girl, with the race of the defendant and victim shifting 
throughout the different study groups.155 One of the variables included strength of evidence.156 
Strength of evidence was evaluated by creating three categories: near-zero, marginal, and 
strong.157 Near zero was defined as a trial with minimal evidence that the defendant in fact 
committed the crime that he was being charged with.158 Questions were raised as to whether the 
defendant was guilty through a prosecution witness stating that the defendant was not the person 
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who committed the assault.159 Marginal evidence was defined as doubtful evidence that was 
created by introducing a positive victim identification and testimony of the defendant’s persistent 
denial of committing the crime.160  Strong evidence was defined as a positive victim 
identification, police testimony of a confession, and the defendant testifying that the victim was 
“asking for it.”161 The results showed that when evidence is at one extreme, either strong 
evidence or close to no evidence, the defendant’s race played little to no role in determining 
culpability.162 However, the level of evidence that was marginal altered the way jurors perceived 
the defendant’s culpability.163 When there is some, but not enough evidence, black defendants 
become more likely to be found culpable than white defendants.164 These results were found to 
be statistically significant (p < .05).165 However, this experiment included only white 
participants.166  
The second experiment included only black undergraduate student participants.167 Every 
other aspect of the experimental study was identical to the first experiment.168 The results of the 
second experiment were not inconsistent with the results of the first experiment. When evidence 
was marginal, black mock jurors tend to find white defendants more culpable than black 
defendants.169 However, there was one difference between the results of the white mock jurors 
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culpable when there is marginal evidence, granted less harsh decisions of culpability, even when 
there was strong evidence against the black defendants.170 This result was statistically significant 




In 1966, researchers Kalven and Zeisel developed a theory aimed at explaining jury 
decisions that resulted in racial disparities: the liberation hypothesis.172 According to this 
hypothesis, when the evidence in a case is contradictory, confusing, or weak, jurors feel 
“liberated” to look to extra-legal factors to make their verdict and sentencing decisions.173 The 
main extra-legal factors studied that tend to affect juror decisions were the race of the defendant, 
the race of the victim, and the severity of the case.174  
Twenty-two years after the liberation hypothesis was created, Barnett, a researcher set out 
to apply the liberation hypothesis to capital cases, developed a scale to quantify the seriousness 
of cases.175 When ranking capital cases, Barnett categorized the variables into three groups: the 
level of certainty jurors have that the defendant is guilty, characteristics of the victim, and the 
severity or heinousness of the crime.176 The results of Barnett’s study showed that in cases where 
jurors could be confident in their decisions, the effects of the white victim/ black defendant dyad 
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were not significant.177 To contrast, in cases where the evidence was contradictory or weak, 
racial disparities in sentencing became significant.178 Barnett’s study confirmed Kalven and 
Zeisel’s liberation hypothesis by showing that when evidence was marginal, jurors looked to 
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V. Reforming Jury Selection in Capital Cases 
 
As findings of racial biases continue to emerge in sociolegal research, it becomes jarringly 
apparent that a solution must be found to address these problems including the impacts of 
defendant race, victim race, and strength of evidence at trial. As recently as 2000, scholars have 
focused on reducing racial biases in jury selection.180 A few solutions have emerged that may be 
quickly and effectively implemented in capital cases across the country: diverse jury composition 
and simplified jury instructions.181 Most importantly, an implicit bias test was created that can 
help protect African American defendants from juror biases that the average juror would not 
admit to willingly.  
 
Diverse Jury Composition 
 
One factor significantly alters the likelihood of an African American defendant being sent to 
death row – jury composition.182 The Supreme Court has noted this as an important factor for 
consideration when creating a fair trial when deciding Batson v. Kentucky in 1986.183 As written 
by Justice Powell in the opinion for Batson v. Kentucky,  
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not 
exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the 
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In 2001, Bowers, Steiner and Sandys conducted a study on jury composition’s effect on 
sentencing outcomes to confirm the data already presented on death sentence reform. 185 The 
study was based on the Capital Jury Project, which interviewed trials across the country, 
including 1,115 jurors from a total of fourteen states.186 By using this data, the study was 
completed with a statistically significant population whose answers are highly credible as each 
participant was an jury member on a real trial rather than being a mock juror. The study 
pronounced two statistically significant patterns with regards to jury composition: 
1. A jury composed of a white majority is associated with a higher likelihood of receiving a 
death penalty in black defendant/white victim cases.  
2. A jury composed of at least one black juror tended to increase the likelihood of imposing 
a life sentence as opposed to a death sentence.187  
When it comes to jury composition, these are two main effects that greatly impact the 
outcome of a trial and sentencing are consistent from study to study.188 These are known as the 
“white male dominance” and the “black male presence” effects.189 When the number of white 
male jurors remains at four, the likelihood of a death sentence is fairly low – a twenty-three 
percent chance; however, when that number changes from four to five white male jurors, there is 
a forty-point increase, making it sixty-three percent likely that the defendant will be sentenced to 
death.190 This is known as the white male dominance effect.191 The black male presence, on the 
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other hand, has the opposite effect. Although not as significant of an increase as the white male 
dominance, the introduction of one black male juror increases the likelihood of a life sentence by 
thirty-four percent.192   
Simplified Jury Instructions 
 
Multiple studies note a second factor as greatly impacting what leads jurors to 
disproportionately sentence African American defendants to the death penalty: incomprehensible 
jury instructions.193 Although studied since the late seventies, there is still an overwhelming level 
of complexity to jury instructions that inhibits a jury’s ability to accurately and effectively render 
verdicts in capital cases.194 The study included one hundred and twenty participants, including 
fifty-eight white participants and sixty-two non-white participants.195 All participants were jury 
eligible.196 The researchers hypothesized that racial bias would be reduced against black 
defendants in participants who received simplified jury instructions.197 Those who received a 
standard version of jury instructions would, in theory, be more likely to impose the death 
sentence.198 The independent variables included in the study were defendant race and type of 
jury instruction, the standard instruction or the simplified instruction.199  
The results of the study confirmed the researchers’ hypotheses: when jurors were given the 
standard jury instructions that were more complex and harder to understand, they were more 
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likely to impose the death penalty.200 Not only was it less likely that jurors imposed the death 
penalty with the simplified instructions, but the simplified instructions also reduced the racial 
disparity that occurs between white jurors and black jurors.201 When the jurors used simplified 
instructions, the difference in sentencing patterns between white and non-white jurors 
disappeared almost entirely when deciding what sentence should be imposed for a black 
defendant.202  
 
Implicit Bias Testing 
 
While many studies on juror decision making focus on racial biases exhibited by jurors 
during voir dire, explicit bias is unlikely to be the sole cause of racial discrimination during 
capital trials.203 Instead, researchers now look to implicit bias for answers on why racial 
disparities occur throughout verdicts and sentencing.204 Implicit bias, as opposed to explicit bias, 
is an unconscious attitude towards a certain type of person based on assessment of a person’s 
characteristics.205 These types of biases tend to stem from stereotypes and cognitive processes 
throughout one’s life.206 Because these attitudes are unconscious, they pose a different type of 
danger to African American defendants; they are difficult to identify and eliminate through jury 
selection.  
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In 1998, a group of scientists founded Project Implicit, a research organization aimed at 
studying implicit biases.207 Through their work, the Implicit Assessment Test (IAT) was created 
to identify participants’ unconscious biases.208 While taking the test, participants categorize 
adjectives with either a good or bad connotation with concepts, race in this case.209 The test is 
meant to be taken as quickly as possible so that participants do not have time to think about what 
belongs there, which would instead indicate explicit bias.210 Since the year 2000, courts have 
used the Implicit Assessment Test one hundred and twelve times in different parts of trial and 
sentencing.211  
The research gained from those cases confirmed the researchers’ hypothesis about racial 
implicit bias being alive and well in the criminal justice system.212 Mark Bennett, a U.S. District 
Court judge, is a prime example of the Court making attempts at eliminating implicit bias.213 In 
2010, Judge Bennett began using the Implicit Assessment Test with jurors by explaining the test 
and encouraging jurors to take the test and take the results into consideration throughout the 
course of trial.214 Since he began this practice, Judge Bennett advocates for acknowledging and 
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In 1972, the Court began to review the death penalty within the context of the Eighth 
Amendment for African American defendants. By holding in Furman v. Georgia that the death 
penalty could not be applied in a way that is not arbitrary or discriminatory, the Court showed 
that African Americans could not be treated differently throughout the process of the criminal 
legal system.216 However, this decision was evidently not sufficient to curtail discrimination in 
jury selection. 
The Court took the first step in reforming jury selections, in Turner v. Murray, by holding 
that jury selection that questioning of potential jurors on their racial biases may be permitted.217 
The Court decided this holding due to “the fact that the crime charged involved interracial 
violence…and the special seriousness of improper sentencing in a capital jury case.”218  
Justice for African American defendants occurs when jury composition reflects an actual jury 
of one’s peers – not a jury dominated by white men that is hand-picked by prosecutors. The key 
to reforming the criminal justice system for African Americans is allowing a jury composition 
that reflects not only the majority, but also the minorities of their community. To do this, the 
Supreme Court must allow voir dire based on racial prejudice and remand district level trials that 
exclude African American jurors. Furthermore, Court should impose a ban on juries that are 
composed of exclusively white jurors. Lastly, before the jury is sworn, judges should explain and 
administer the Implicit Administration Test to prospective jurors. In doing so, judges could 
minimize the influence of implicit bias within capital trials for African American defendants and 
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allow these defendants a fairer trial. When the courts mandate these solutions in capital trials, our 
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